The purpose of this paper is to examine within the framework provided by a vintage model of productive activity the pertinent evidence on output, inputs, and the age of fixed capital to further understanding of the sources of growth in Soviet agricultural output. The basic procedure consists of tentatively accepting the embodiment hypothesis, which states that any positive growth in factor productivity is the consequence of improved quality of fixed capital. Data on the age of capital are taken as indicative of its technological quality, and implied rates of growth in such quality are computed as a residual. Conclusions drawn from strict acceptance of the hypothesis are tempered to account for additional qualitative evidence and for the possibility that equipment may be a more effective carrier than structures. Everything considered, it seems that the embodiment hypothesis can make a useful contribution to understanding Soviet agricultural development. S E VE R AL careful studies have suggested recently that long-term trends in output of the agricultural sector, like those of an aggregate economy, often can be explained only partially by the corresponding trends in traditionally measured factors of production [14; 21, p. 45] . As a matter of fact, in a number of developed countries, among them the United States [21, p. 57] , Canada, the United Kingdom, and the German Federal Republic [9] , it seems that for substantial periods the growth of factor productivity! on the farm matched or exceeded that of other major sectors.
In the Soviet Union, where right up to the present farming has occupied an especially prominent position in what has become a leading industrial economy, analysis of agricultural productivity is of special interest. Understandably, several attempts have been made to relate trends in Soviet farm output to changes in measurable factor inputs [8, 11, 18] ; and for the longterm (1928-62) as well as for the "normal" postwar period, there again appears something of a tendency for growth of output to be faster than that of inputs. The purpose of this paper is to examine, within the framework provided by a vintage model of productive activity, the pertinent evidence on output, inputs, and age of fixed capital, in an attempt to further understanding of agrarian development under Soviet-style socialism. Variables measured in value terms are based on data in 1937 prices except when, for analytical reasons [22, p. 281] , 1928 prices seem more ap- 2 According to Douglas B. Diamond [8, p. 847 ] the weather may be described as follows:
Year
Growing conditions  Year  Growing conditions   1950  slightly favorable  1957  normal  1951  subnormal  1958  exceptionally favorable  195~slightly favorable  1959  unfavorable  1958  normal  1960  normal  1954  normal  1961  above average  1955  normal  1962  normal  1956 above average
Diamond also suggests that conditions for producing livestock products reflect the weather with a one-year lag. Thus, farm output in 1957 and 1962 have been judged to be similarly affected by weather in both the major farm sectors. Apparently 1958 differed from 1957 and 1962 only with respect to slightly less favorable conditions for producing livestock products, so that comparisons involving average annual rates of growth of output based on 1953 may reflect a slight upward bias. Given that livestock products probably contributed less than half of agricultural output and that a presumably small measurement error is being averaged over a four-year period, it would seem reasonable to expect that any bias would be quite modest.
propriate. In many cases alternative measures in 19f1S, 1950, or 1955 prices are available, but in general they result in quite similar quantitative conclusions. In any event, the principal purpose here will be to attempt an interpretation of the data based on the assumption that the measurements reflect valid approximations of the "true" values of the variables."
Sources of Growth
Simple inspection of the data on inputs in juxtaposition with those on output can give considerable insight into the connections between them. But even in preparation of these data, substantial assumptions about economic relationships were necessary.! H we are willing to experiment with some hypotheses about the lines of interdependence between the variables, it might be possible to comprehend better the Soviet Russian agricultural productive process.
Previous investigators have followed a variety of procedures. Karcz [19] lists and inspects the measures on the various inputs separately, with no attempt at aggregation. Diamond [S] and Johnson [IS] consider hypotheses about the nature of the agricultural production function. Johnson expresses the economist's usual preference for the Cobb-Douglas version but, for purposes of comparability with studies of the United States, turns to the infinite-elasticity-of-substitution function; Diamond chooses to aggregate his inputs geometrically. In this study, we employ as the basic analytical framework the embodiment or "carrier" hypothesis, which permits consideration of some additional pertinent information, namely, data on the age of fixed capital.
The carrier hypothesis states essentially that the principal reason for productivity gains has been technical advance embodied in new capital items that reflect in their design and construction a multitude of advances in science and technology. This hypothesis has enjoyed tremendous initial appeal, at least to some degree, because of its consistency with wide varieties of everyday experience as well as with systematic historical descriptions of basic scientific and technological developments. It may be stated fairly rigorously as follows:
(1)
In fact, the measures doubtlessly only approximate the magnitudes desired for analytical purposes. The data on capital are particularly suspect, and a comparison with the work of other investigators is made in Appendix A. 4 It is assumed, for example, that ruble factor costs are indeed appropriate weights for arithmetically aggregating outputs and inputs. 6 For the convenience of the reader, a summary of the genesis of (1) is presented here. First we recall that, granted certain conditions, the production function with disembodied technical change may be written (2) .110
where LlA/A is a residual including the effects of all factors other than inputs of labor and capital, both of which are unadjusted for quality change. By substituting LlJ/J, the rate of growth of quality-adjusted fixed capital stock, for LlK/K and, accordingly, ./lA'/A' for LlA/A, we obtain
The quality-adjusted capital input is defined as
where t is the date of measurement and tI, the vintage, is the date of investment. Thus in weighting the capital items, their age is taken as a proxy for their "quality," which improves at a rate of Apercent each year. It can be shown that
The first two terms on the right hand side of (5) approximate the rate of growth of the quality refers to relations between variables on which we have already presented much information but calls also for evidence on three more--growth in the quality of fixed capital stock, its average age, and the net impact of all other factors affecting the growth of output. The carrier hypothesis, like other production functions, is a statement pertinent to any level of aggregation. It has been made about entire economies including, therefore, the farm sector; and indeed a recent study [26, pp. 975ff ] has concluded that technological improvements carried by capital did contribute significantly to growth of output on Israeli kibbutzim. The hypothesis is not without plausibility in reference to agriculture in the United States," and at least one analyst of Soviet farming has suggested that availability of the proper machinery is especially important in the USSR where, because of climatic limitations, it is imperative to accomplish such basic tasks as plowing, seeding, and harvesting within an exceedingly short period of time [19] .
In the current state of economic knowledge, it is possible to obtain quantitative evidence compressed into a single indicator regarding only one of the added variables, the average age of fixed capital. Taken as a proxy for the average quality of capital, age is in its own right an interesting variable. 8 adjusted capital stock when there is no change in its average age. The third term provides an adjustment to account for changing a.
Substituting the right-hand side of (5) for!J.J /J in (8) and rearranging terms, we obtain (1).
The interested reader may find a more detailed account of the derivation, with an implementation using data on the aggregate U. S. economy in [28] and a thorough discussion of production functions and technical change generally, in [2] . 7 Griliches [18] has argued that increasing capital quality is an important reason for the apparent rise in factor productivity as often measured for farming in the United States. William McD. Herr [14] also implies that physical capital may be an important carrier of technical advance.
S Moorsteen and Powell [22, p. 807] , have questioned the use of age as a proxy for quality in the Soviet case because" ... there is no satisfactory way to date the technology embodied in assets created in any given year." The dating problem stems in part from long periods of production for certain items of equipment.
But the fact that a given model is produced over a long period would not seem to preclude dating of average embodied technology. Suppose, for example, that investment is composed of only two capital items, automobiles and carriages, with the former accounting for 5 percent of the total in year 1 and carriages accounting for the remaining 95 percent. Suppose further that 20 years later the shares were reversed. The average technology embodied in the items from the later year would differ substantially from that in the initial year without any model change whatsoever. In fact the piece of equipment perhaps most instrumental in transforming the American economy in recent history, the automobile, gained preeminence through the production of a single model, Ford's model T, for close to 20 years. In a large sector of an economy with many productive activities and a large number of capital items, long model runs would be entirely consistent with fairly steady progress in the aggregate. Thus, technology may very well be regarded as advancing in quantum jumps, introducing a new item with a technique doubly, triply, or even a hundred fold more productive. This model may be produced for a number of years, replacing the item that formerly filled that need. With many innovations in many different productive activities over a number of years, the aggregate process may not be exactly continuous, but the model assuming continuity in the aggregate and on the average may provide a useful approximation to the "truth" in all its complexity. Thus, it would seem Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajae/article-abstract/51/4/882/116722 by guest on 09 January 2019
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Considered in conjunction with the embodiment hypothesis, it may prove to be even more useful. While some interesting evidence is summarized below, ultimately it is necessary to make an essentially arbitrary assumption about the net quantitative significance of the numerous other factors that might plausibly be connected with changes in productivity. In this paper it has been assumed that in the postwar period unspecified factors, on balance, neither detracted from nor contributed to changes in productivity. It seems likely, therefore, that values for A, which are computed as a residual, and the absolute values for dA(-Aa)/l+A(-Aa), which in turn depend on A, are subject to some upward bias."
Paying special attention to the periods chosen for analysis, let us consider now the available information on the age of Soviet agricultural fixed capital (see Appendix Table A. 2). The basic pattern of change from period to period resembles in many respects that for the total fixed capital stock [22, p. 886 ], but important differences do appear. There is a moderate decline in the prewar period amounting to little more than a year between 1928 and 1987. The wartime and postwar changes are rather more dramatic. Thus the available data suggest that the low investment during World War II prompted a rise in a to a postwar peak, 15.5 years, that substantially exceeded the 1928 level. But in the 1950's, when investment and retirement of structures accelerated, it declined at a truly spectacular rate to a threedecade, and quite probably alltime, low, 6.6 years, by the latter 1950's. But then the average age stabilized and even showed some tendency to rise again'" as the growth of fixed capital stock abated. Thus, in Soviet agriculture too, variations in the average age of fixed capital have been prominent.
What are the implications of these variations for the sources of growth in that a dating problem because of long model runs does not eliminate the possibility that a relatively thorough and rigorous investigation of the implications of accepting the embodiment hypothesis may help to clarify its usefulness for contributing to our understanding of growth of agricultural output in the USSR. It also has been suggested that, because of the perennial dire shortages of spare parts in the Soviet Union, a significant effect of changing average age of equipment may be changing of the fraction operable during the course of a given year. To the extent that this is so, our estimates of the impact of embodied technology are biased in a direction inverse to the movement of a. 9 By assuming~A'/A'=O, we havẽ
This quadratic in A is solved for positive roots only. 10 The rapid decline in the postwar period as computed here stems to a considerable extent from retirements of aged structures, and their actual occurrence is open to doubt. Therefore a recomputation on the alternative assumption that all structures continued to be used seemed output? The data in Table~summarize the results of calculations based on the statistics presented above and, for the postwar period, on acceptance of the embodiment hypothesis as stated in equation (1). It seems hardly worthwhile, however, to attempt full application of (1) to the data on the prewar period. The growth of measured inputs alone more than suffices to explain growth in output. If increases in the quality of capital and declines in its average age made a positive contribution in this period, they were overshadowed and overcome by negative factors. Indeed, it is difficult to analyze farming in the USSR during 1928-87 under the assumption, implicit in the vintage model, that we are studying the behavior of human beings engaged in the "ordinary business of life." As is well known, they were instead in the throes of collectivization and turmoil the extent of which probably no one, including those in the top echelons of the Soviet government, has even a remotely reliable measure.'! a Computed from data presented in Table 1 accepting the embodiment hypothesis as formulated in appro:zimation (1). Data may not sum exactly to totals because of rounding.
o A preliminary investigation suggests that, in terms of contributions to output as assessed within the framework provided by equation (1), educational capital might have contributed something on the order of leu than 0.5 percentage point to growth of agricultural output in the decade of the 1950·s. Evidence on levels of educational attainment from [28, p. 17; 29, pp. 78-79 and 123) and associated costs from [6, p. 78J, taken together, suggest that as of January 15, 1959 , educational capital per man may have been on the order of 1/2 the level for the economy as a whole. On the other hand, inspection of evidence on the comparative progress in educational attainments from [7, p. 809] and [29, pp. 88 and 116] suggests, though not conclusively, that cumulative costs of formal schooling per man may have been growing faster in the agricultural sector. All told, it seems safe to assume that a more eztensive calculation will not result in an estimated percentage point contribution vastly different from those computed for the economy as a whole (0.39 in 1950--58 and 0.25 in 1958-61) [2, p. 309J. Thus, a substantial modification of the general conclusions of this paper probably will not be required on this account.
11 Some feeling for the extent of the chaos may be gained from diverse sources. Donald Treadgold [27, p. 272] asserts that at least five million peasants died in the process of collectivization and the resultant famine in 198~-83, and he reports that Stalin revealed to Churchill at Yalta that the figure was really ten million. Robert W. Campbell [5,p. 24] states that "some five million persons were deported or shot." According to Leonard E. Hubbard [15] , as many as five millionJamilies may have been deported to Siberia or the Far North. To maintain perspective, we must recall that the agricultural labor force in 1928 was on the order of thirtythree to thirty-four million [~~, p. 865].
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Under the circumstances, an inspection of the annual changes in our data, shown in Table 3 , may prove useful. It would seem that the impediments to growth were concentrated in the early plan period, when, in addition to the chaos, and doubtlessly in large part as a result of it, labor and livestock inputs suffered four successive and substantial declines in 19~9 through 193~. These were offset to some extent by steadily, and apparently notably, rising inputs of fixed capital and land. But the upshot appears to have been a persistent contraction in output. Only in 1933, with the restoration of growth in labor input, was the trend reversed and recovery under way. Presumably growth of aggregate output would again outpace that of combined inputs during 193~-37, but this was a period heavily affected by recovery from the depths of the collectivization crisis. Output had not reattained the 19~8 level on a sustained basis even by the latter 1930's. World War II also brought such turmoil, disruption, and displacement that again strict application of our model would seem to bear little promise for fruitful empirical implementation. But it was otherwise after the war. By comparison with most of the preceding Soviet period, the years following 1950 were clearly more amenable to interpretation under a rigorous model rooted in the assumption of normalcy.
In this period, sizable residuals did appear, something on the order of 50 percent of the growth rate of output being unexplained by growth of measured inputs. Thus, in 1953-6~, the average growth of output amounted to 5.5 percent a year compared with only~.9 percent a year anticipated from considering measured inputs alone. Under the carrier hypothesis, the remaining~.6 percentage points may be distributed between two factors: (1) the declining average age of capital, 0.6 percentage point; and (~) the quality of fixed capital, including the net impact of all unspecified variables,
.O percentage points.P Thus, it would appear that a substantial part of the residual, over~o percent in 1953-6~, was the contribution of a rapid and once-and-for-all reduction in the average age of capital. Since even a significant acceleration of growth in capital stock probably would not induce much of a further decline in its average age," any future rapid advance of factor productivity similar to that of the 1950's could not draw on this source.14 While this interpretation has some appeal, consideration of sub-periods within 1953-6~reveals that it may have been a variable unspecified in our strict vintage model, economic policy, rather than improved capital design that was most influential in stimulating growth of productivity. As a matter of fact, agriculture was still the subject of substantial controversy and change after World War II. Commotion and confusion were far from completely absent, and there was no simple orderly feeding of inputs into the farm sector with easily predictable results. Conclusions gleaned from a rigorous analysis again must be tempered by taking some account of other changes in the environment.
Virtually every account of Soviet agricultural performance contributes to the impression that, besides the drive for collectivization in the early 1930's, there were interspersed throughout the entire plan period many shifts in policy and environment with possibly notable consequences for productivity. It may be useful to recall here that there have been changes in: commodity prices, prices of inputs, tax and procurement procedures, pressure to change the size of private plots and private holdings of livestock, the age-sex composition of the labor force, size of the collective and/ or state farms, importance of state farms relative to collectives, the internal organization of state and collective farms, planning procedures and autonomy of the collectives, credit policy, labor input norms for the socialized sector (in effect setting maximum time permitted on the private plots), the basis for sales of feed grains and concentrates to households, the differentiation of procurement quotas by region, the official attitude toward and setting of conditions surrounding operation of collective farm markets, and so 12 The contributions of the declining Ii and the quality of fixed capital are computed as dX(-~a)/l+X(-~a), and dx, respectively. 13 See [4J for a discussion of the relationship between the rate of growth of a capital stock and its age, 14 Students of the Soviet economy generally seem to agree that other sources, including economic policy changes, could substantially affect productivity as usually measured. David Granick [12, p. 2561has argued effectively that organizational change may have had a marked impact on productivity in the Soviet economy. forth. There has been practically an endless procession of administrative reshuffies. There have been campaigns by the Communist Party of which collectivization is but one, though conspicuous, example. Other governmental actions include: the early consolidation of the numerous noncontiguous strips into large fields for power farming; indiscriminate implementation of many practices, such as universal use of perennial grasses in crop rotation, without regard to regional differences; indiscriminate adoption of certain types of farm equipment, such as unduly large tractors; expansion of crops in unsuitable areas; institution of production cost accounting; introduction of guaranteed remuneration for collective farmers; elimination of the double price system; and institution of flexible prices. These changes often came at different times in various regions and often pertained to specific subsets of productive units such as: farms growing technical crops, state farms in proximity to urban areas, collective farms, state farms, the entire socialized sector, or the private plots." There were also appeals to patriotism; and there were informal but probably highly influential admonitions, such as Khrushchev's warning to local officials on one occasion that the decisive criterion in judging performance of meat production would be growth in output of the socialized sector [24] .
Given, however, the qualitative nature of most of the evidence, the complexities of the detail regarding temporal and spatial considerations, and the numerous factors involved with no apparent basis for aggregation, it is scarcely surprising that no one has been able to pin down a general quantitative indicator for the net impact during the plan period as a whole, let alone by subperiod. Yet the qualitative evidence in some cases is quite sufficient to support a substantial consensus about its direction. In particular, students of Soviet farm policy, including ex-premier Khrushchev" himself, agree that at the time of Stalin's death in 1953 incentives and organization were scarcely conducive to efficiency [8, 17, 19, 33] . They also agree that changes initiated almost immediately thereafter and through 1957 probably constituted significant steps toward "monetization," "liberalization," "marketization," or "decentralization" of the Soviet agricultural sector with decidedly beneficial effects on economic rationality and efficiency. It seems clear that the overall environment in the immediate post-Stalin period was undeniably favorable to productivity gains as a result largely of rapidly rising procurement prices, real wages, and autonomy enjoyed by the collective farmers in the socialized sector as well as on their private plots. 15 There exists a sizable literature in English detailing the shifts in Soviet agricultural policy. See, for example. [8. 16. 17, 19 .~O, !l4, 88] and the citations therein. 16 It's true that he was a man of many interests and not a professional student of agriculture. On the other hand, he did have more than a passing interest in the subject, and perhaps more importantly, his conclusions, on this point at least, are in full agreement with the opinions of Western and many Soviet specialists. In other words, collective farmers' real wages almost doubled within a fiveyear period and continued to grow at the seemingly acceptable pace of almost five percent per annum for several subsequent years. The fact that the initial values in 1953 were abysmally low, even by Soviet standards, may not completely vitiate the effect on incentives. Lazar Volin [33] suggests that a response was clear in the rapid rise in the number of days worked per man on the collective farms, although he also cautions against concluding that there occurred "anything like a corresponding rise in the efficiency of labor."
Regarding the period since 1958, there has been less unanimity among Western scholars who have in some cases reached rather differing conclusions indeed. Compare for example, the interpretation by Durgin [10] with that by Karcz [19] . Durgin views the period from 195~to 1962 as an essentially uninterrupted march, even if at a fitful pace, toward "monetization" and eventually "free sales," albeit with a state monopoly on one side of the market. Karcz also perceives clear progress in 1953-57 but retrogression thereafter until the installation of the new leadership in 1964. Diamond [8] , though less emphatic, similarly stresses retrogression and confusion from continual administrative reshuffle. The extreme diversity of opinion on this period may be seen by comparing the treatments of various scholars regarding the abolition of the machine-tractor stations.
Bearing in mind the above discussion, the results of implementing the rigorous vintage model with data from the subperiods within 1953-62 are of special interest.P The decline in average age of fixed capital (see Appendix Table A. 2) was concentrated in 1953-57. According to the carrier hypothesis, the growth of factor productivity should be comparatively large in this period, especially since ii seems to have risen in 1957-62. Inspection of the data in Table 2 indicates that such was indeed the case; growth of factor productivity in 1953-57 was more than double that in 1957-62. Furthermore, it seems that in the first period 40 percent of the residual may have been accounted for by the declining ii. Perhaps even more interesting is the implication that the smaller residual in 1957-62 may be due partially to the drag of a rising ii. It seems that despite the essentially sustained contribution from the improving quality of capital, the residual fell because of the rise in average age. On the basis of the evidence presented here, the fall in the growth rate in the second period did stem largely from a reduced growth of inputs, but superimposed on this was the further drag from aging of the fixed capital stock.
In sum, if we abstract from information on economic policy and look at the data for 1953-62, an interpretation based on acceptance of the embodiment hypothesis appears reasonably plausible. If we turn to the subperiods, the predictions of the hypothesis also seem to be consistent with the data. On the other hand, we have practically unanimous expert testimony to the effect that there are other variables, which, though less easily quantified, constitute alternative plausible explanations of the surge in factor productivity in the mid-1950's and of its subsequent ebb.!" For the period 1953-57, in particular, there is available an impressive body of opinion suggesting that improved government policy could have dominated, and therefore estimates of dX and of dX(-Llii)/l +X( -Llii) under the unmodified vintage model seem clearly subject to upward bias. For this period we have reason, a fortiori, for regarding the estimates as an upper limit; but the evidence on the net effect of unspecified organizational factors in 1957-62 seems inconclusive, and, from Karcz's viewpoint, our measures of dX could understate the "truth." There is, however, still another, wider perspective from which to look at the matter.
Disaggregation and analysis of the separate sectors, the nonagricultural nonresidential in [3] and the agricultural here, gives results, which, when focussing on the longer subperiods, further support the carrier hypothesis. In each of the two subsectors, it seems that rather spectacular spurts in productivity carne, as the hypothesis would predict, during periods when sis to a period of intermediate range, so that errors from ignoring short-term lagged relationships and measurement error would be small.
We must also remember that the concentration of the decline in the average age of capital in the first subperiod may overstate the "truth" (see footnote 10) . 18 Examination of statistics for another period raises further doubts. During 1949-54 the average annual decline in Ii was even greater, specifically, 1.23 years per year compared with -0.78 years per year in 1953-57. Adjusting partially for the effects of weather by taking threeyear averages for output and comparing growth of combined inputs with growth in output one finds, nevertheless, a slightly negative residual for this period. the age of fixed capital was dropping at rapid rates. In the nonagricultural nonresidential sector, it was during 19f18-87 that factor productivity contributed 7.8 percentage points to a 16.fl percentage point growth rate. And of this 7.8 percentage points, fl.8 seem to have resulted from the very rapid decline in the age of fixed capital. In this sector in 1950-58, declines in average age, which by then were much less pronounced, contributed only 0.5 percentage point to a much reduced residual of only 8.6. In agriculture, as we have just seen, it was in the postwar period that the age of capital fell precipitously, and factor productivity, apparently boosted in part thereby, underwent an extraordinarily rapid rise.
In conclusion, the embodiment hypothesis certainly does not constitute the final word on sources of Soviet agricultural growth. Indeed the results of a further investigation focusing on equipment as the most likely carrier of technology (see Appendix B) raises serious doubts. We may eventually find that other models'? will provide more appealing interpretations of the observations. On the other hand it is interesting to note the broad similarity in the results of this study with those on the Israeli kibbutzim. For the present, we suggest with some confidence that the vintage model of production does contribute some insight into Soviet agricultural growth and will continue to deserve attention.
Appendix A-The Data
The data underlying the analysis are presented in Appendix Tables A.l and A.fl. Summary descriptions of the data and/or the methods used in its compilation, along with references to the literature containing more detail, are provided in notes to the tables.
Reliability of data on capital
Seriously questioning the reliability of their data on agricultural capital stock, Moorsteen and Powell [flfl, p. 85] use it only to suggest how the aggregate capital series might have behaved differently from the nonagricultural sector. Thus, it seems especially appropriate to compare their results with those from previous studies. For a substantial number of overlapping years, clear conceptual differences notwithstanding, their data correspond, in at least some respects, reasonably closely to those used for more extensive analytical purposes by Johnson [18] and especially Diamond [8] . Even after taking note of the conceptual disparities, however, some disturbing numerical divergencies appear. The data are adjusted for changes in the number of man-days worked per year but not for the number of hours per day. Officially reported statistics on employment in state and institutional farms, Machine Tractor Stations and Repair Technical Stations, and state agricultural services constitute the basis for estimates. Man-day inputs on collective farms and private plots were estimated by Miss Nancy Nimitz from diverse sources including sample data, and these were converted to man-year equivalents by Moorsteen and Powell based on the days worked per year in large-scale industry. Allowance was made for nonagricultural productive activities of persons engaged principally in agriculture. Thus, the data constitute a sheer physical measure with no adjustment for changes in age, sex, or other indicator of quality.
Sources: [I, p, 26] and [22, p. 365 ]. e The statistics on agricultural fixed capital stock were obtained as the difference between the Moorsteen-Powell series on the total and nonagricultural capital stocks. The data reflect initial stocks of structures and equipment as of January I, 1928, as estimated in [22, p. 49 ] from information in a document of the Soviet State Planning Commission. For subsequent years, stocks as of January 1 were computed by adding gross investment and deducting retirements.
Investment in structures was obtained by applying Soviet current price data on the distribution of investment between agricultural and nonagricultural structures to the figures for total construction. The estimated stocks of agricultural structures consist of items used directly in production, including, for example, irrigation works, but excluding residences and cultural or industrial capital located on the farms.
The equipment component reflects stocks and flows of "agricultural machines, tractors, trucks, and other means of transport (for example, horse drawn vehicles)." For 1928-35 and 1956 , investment data in current prices are deflated to 1937 values. For intervening years, investment was interpolated on deliveries to the farms where possible and on production elsewhere. For the years following 1956, estimates were made by extrapolation on an official series. In general, it may be said that the data provide a splendid example of the incredibly complex detective work based on extremely diverse bits of evidence that have been necessary to form a Western picture of Soviet economic "reality." Moorsteen and Powell provide an admirably detailed presentation of their sources and procedures in [I, pp, [11] [12] [22, p, 102] provide the following description: "The value of capital in livestock is calculated from stocks measured in physical units ... and from average realized prices.... The estimates take account of changes over time in the average weight of animals in the herds but not of other qualitative changes such as in age or breed. They include cows, other cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, and horses, but omit rabbits, fowl, bees, camels, mules, buffaloes, and the like."
e Information on land includes sown area, omitting fallow and pasture. Sources: [1, p. 27] and [22, p. 250] . f For the period since 1950 the index in [8] was used. It includes fertilizer, electric power, fuels and lubricants, current repair services, and industrially processed feedstuffs. For overlapping years, it shows very close correspondence with the index based on fertilizer and petroleum products from [18] . The latter index has been used for the period through 1950. The correspondence is all the more remarkable in view of the obvious differences in the underlying data. Diamond's estimates are in 1955 prices. They include draft animals, and they refer to midyear values. Although he depends essentially on the official Soviet figures, he also reports checking his published estimate against an independently constructed index of machinery stocks and agricultural structures, finding only an approximately five percent difference from the official index in 1962 (starting with both equal to 100 in 1928). Another indicator of reasonable reliability is the behavior of the annual data. As may be seen in Figure 1 , the growth rates for each of the twelve overlapping postwar years compare closely in order of magnitude and show a tendency to a similar pattern of change-decline in the early 1950's, resurgence in the middle 1950's, followed by another decline in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
Appendix
On balance, it will be well to remember that when the archives open and a more reliable index of capital inputs into Soviet agriculture may be constructed, further adjustments probably will be necessary. In the meantime the Moorsteen and Powell data present several advantages: (1) annual measures over lengthy spans; (2) consistency with other variables; and (3) above all, detail on compilation and description of procedures with the consequent possibility for calculating average age. Furthermore, the similarityof at least some of the independent measures for the postwar period may inspire some confidence in the reliability of the numerical values for the later period at least. ,.. Aggregate analyses involving the embodiment hypothesis generally have employed a comprehensive concept of capital, including equipment and structures. A plausible refinement suggests that we focus on equipment alone, since it appears likely to be especially effective as a carrier of new technology. Some feeling for the importance of technical advance embodied in agricultural machinery may be gained by examining the data presented in Table B .t. on mechanization of some major Soviet farm activities. It would seem that, even after allowing for the fact that data in the official statistical handbooks may be selected to create a favorable impression, the real gains probably were substantial. The apparently great strides forward in mechanization during the 1950's would seem to support the notion that technology carried by equipment may well have been important, if not predominant, in advancing factor productivity.
Then, too, it 'was during the early to mid-or-latter 1950's, when the first important growth in factor productivity appeared) that the composition of Soviet agricultural capital stock altered drastically, and again probably unprecedentedly, in favor of equipment (from 25 percent of the total in 1950 to almost 70 percent in 1957). Thus a preliminary inspection of some relevant data tends to increase confidence in the possible usefulness of the alternative hypothesis. This is not to say that structures do not carry new technology or that they might not be necessary complements to machines, constituting therefore an essentially indivisible package in which society must invest in order to obtain the benefits of the new techniques more clearly carried by equipment. Electric power lines, for example, though structures, may embody new technology in the sense of more effectively transmitting electricity. They are also clearly essential to the operation of certain pieces of equipment installed on the farm. In fact, one may wish to view them, though nominally structures, as an essentially integral part of the equipment actually in use on the farm.
Normally one would expect, however, that the rate of improvement in structures per se would be far less than the average for all :fixed capital. Suppose we examine the possibilities for employing the alternative hypothesis to interpret the evidence on Soviet agricultural development. We shall see that a strict extension of the analysis in the text raises further doubts about the usefulness of the carrier hypothesis.
In the first place, the 1937 weight for :fixed capital, including structures, is only 0.0886; equipment in turn accounted for less than 30 percent of agricultural gross capital stock. The embodiment hypothesis thus puts the burden for carrying technology (and explaining an occasionally large residual) on a productive agent whose own weight in the national income is quite small. In those cases where~A/A is substantial, the rate of improvement in the quality of equipment (A g) will have to be rather large. 2o 900 / EARL R. BRUBAKER Furthermore, there are complications suggested by the alternative interpretation due to the extremely uneven changes in the stock of agricultural equipment and consequently in its gross value weighted average age, (a(l)' The decline during "Vorld War II and the recovery in the period immediately following were much more pronounced in stocks of agricultural equipment than in structures. There were substantial successive reductions in each year, 1942 through 1947. Although some of the decline apparently did represent retirement of aged, wornout items, it also reflected the low levels, and in some years utter lack of gross investment during the war. The upshot was that aq seems to have reached over 7 years by the end of 1945, i.e., a level not quite 3 times as high as the prewar minimum computed for January 1, 1936 .
Under these conditions, a return to more nearly normal growth of investment had the inevitable numerical consequence that values for a q fell rather rapidly. By the early postwar period, retirements of equipment acquired in the latter 1930's were becoming substantial, and their impact on a q was especially apparent, so that it began to decline even before growth in the stock of equipment reappeared. As reconstruction progressed, annual investment in equipment became very large relative to existing stocks; and the growth of the equipment stock (AKq/Kq) accelerated to clearly unsustainable rates, capped by an extremely atypical 98.8 percent spurt in the two years 1950-51 with successive rises of 36 and 46 percent, respectively. In the subsequent years the growth rate necessarily ebbed rapidly.
The movement of aq (see Appendix Table A. 2) reflects, of course, these diverse currents. There was a spectacular descent from 7.2 years at the end of 1945 to 2.5 year by the end of 1950. When AKq/K qreceded to more nearly normal levels, though remaining probably still quite high by many standards, a q actually began to rise through the remainder of the 1950's. Strictly speaking then, the alternative hypothesis would predict a boost to productivity in the early postwar period, followed by a drag throughout the 1950's. Suppose that we were to choose the periods 1947-50 and 1953-57 on the basis of substantial variation in the variable of primary interest in the vintage interpretation, aq• What values would be obtained for A q and d'A q ( -Aa q)/1+(A q )(-Aaq)?21 The outcome in this case is the reverse of expectations based on the carrier hypothesis. Specifically, in 1947-50 all measured inputs grew faster than output, so that regardless of the weights, or the elasticity of substitution for that matter, no residual remains to be explained. Furthermore, one might suspect that during this period of reconversion and reconstruction the average quality of the labor force improved considerably and that restoration of idle machinery contributed importantly to restoration of output. These factors, along with the rapid reduction in a q under a strict implementation of the carrier hypothesis, would lead one to anticipate the appearance of at least some residual in this period. During 1953-57, on the other hand, when the rising a q would be expected to constitute a drag on factor productivity, our computations show instead a sizable residual.
Thus, strict application of the equipment carrier hypothesis would appear to give little support to embodiment as a major explanation of growth in factor productivity in Soviet agriculture. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the conclusion to be reached from the intermediate range analysis employed is very sensitive to the choice of period. Thus, 1948-62 is a period of significant decline in aq, but 1950-62 is one of significant rise. Finally, the data on mechanization, along with those on the changing composition of capital stock when the residual appeared in the 1950's, remain powerfully suggestive.
